Arizona Supreme Court Clarifies Qualifications For Experts in Medical Malpractice Cases

Allen v. Arojojoye

Arizona Supreme Court

August 21, 2026

JSH Attorney: Eileen GilBride

Arizona Supreme Court Clarifies Qualifications For Experts in Medical Malpractice Cases

A plaintiff claiming medical malpractice has the burden of proving that the defendant physician fell below the standard of care.  The plaintiff generally must meet this burden with qualified expert testimony.  A.R.S. § 12-2604 specifies that if the physician defendant was or claims that he was a specialist at the time of treatment, then the plaintiff’s expert must also have had the same specialty at the time of the occurrence.  The same-specialty requirement applies only if the “care or treatment at issue” was within that specialty.  Also, the statute requires that to be a specialist, the expert must have spent the majority of his time practicing in that specialty during the year prior to the occurrence at issue.

In Allen v. Arojojoye, the Supreme Court: (a) clarified that in this case, the “treatment at issue” was what the plaintiff alleged Dr. Arojojoye failed to do rather than what he did do; (b) held that to be a specialist, the defendant physician also must have spent the majority of his time prior to the treatment practicing in that specialty—a requirement only previously suggested in dicta; and (c) held that the trial court must analyze whether the requirements of the defendant’s board certification indicate that the board certification is a “qualifying” board certification within the meaning of the statute.

Crystal Allen was in a skilled nursing facility.  Dr. Arojojoye, an internist and board-certified wound care specialist who had been called in as part of the wound care service team, evaluated and treated her pressure ulcer.  Other physicians, including a hospitalist and infectious disease specialist, were treating the patient’s co-morbidities.  The plaintiff alleged, however, that Dr. Arojojoye failed to treat a septic infection that developed.  Plaintiff obtained an internal medicine expert to testify against Dr. Arojojoye.  Dr. Arojojoye moved for summary judgment on the ground that he treated the patient as a board-certified wound care specialist and the expert was not a board-certified wound care specialist.

The trial court denied summary judgment, reasoning that Dr. Arojojoye was “acting as an internist” when treating the patient.  Dr. Arojojoye filed a special action, arguing that the trial court should have analyzed whether he was practicing within his wound care specialty, not whether another specialty could have treated the patient.  The court of appeals reversed.  It reasoned that the record was uncontroverted that Dr. Arojojoye was called in as part of the wound care team, was treating her wound, and was a board-certified wound care specialist; so Plaintiff’s expert, who was not board certified in wound care, was not qualified to testify under A.R.S. § 12-2604.

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision.  First it said the specialty issue depended on the treatment and care at issue, and the treatment and care at issue was not what Dr. Arojojoye was doing when he treated the patient, but what the plaintiff alleged he failed to do.  If failing to treat the infection was within the wound care specialty, then the expert had to be a wound care specialist.  But the record was not clear on this point, so the case had to go back to the trial court for that analysis.

Second, the court made explicit a point that it had only suggested in a prior case, that is, that if the defendant physician was claiming to be a specialist, he must have spent the majority of his time prior to the treatment at issue practicing in that specialty.  A.R.S. § 12-2604 does not include that requirement—it only addresses the qualifications of experts—but in a prior case, the court had noted that if that was a requirement for the expert, it should also be a requirement for the defendant.

Third, the court noted that a trial court should examine whether the defendant physician’s claimed specialty has the indicia of a true specialty—including whether (1) it is a voluntary process administered by an organization that recognizes certain practice areas of a branch of medicine or surgery; (2) it requires graduation from an accredited medical school; (3) it involves “successful completion of residency or other training,” reflecting distinct training and experience; and (4) it requires an exam for certification and “continuing education and practice requirements.” Other indicators of a qualifying board certification include the conferral of “certain advantages such as hospital privileges, lower malpractice insurance rates, and higher salaries.”  But the certification does not need to be recognized by the ABMS.  Nor are a physician’s motives for obtaining certification relevant.  The court instructed the trial court on remand to make this determination for Dr. Arojojoye’s wound care certification.

The Allen decision does not change the law with respect to experts in medical malpractice cases.  But it clarifies the analysis the trial court should use in determining whether an expert meets the requirements of A.R.S. § 12-2604.