McMahan v. Grasshopper Trans, Inc., No. CV-25-0287-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona
July 30, 2026
JSH Attorney: Justin Ackerman
Arizona Supreme Court Holds That a Defendant’s Post-Default Conduct Cannot Retroactively Waive a Challenge to an Entry of Default Void for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Brandon McMahan sued Grasshopper Trans, Inc. for injuries he sustained when a tractor trailer owned by Grasshopper struck construction-site barricades that then struck him. McMahan’s process server attempted to serve Grasshopper’s statutory agent but instead left the summons and complaint with the agent’s assistant, who was not authorized to accept service on Grasshopper’s behalf. When Grasshopper did not respond within the applicable period, McMahan obtained an entry of default.
Six weeks later, Grasshopper answered the complaint, denied ownership of the tractor trailer, and flagged insufficient service of process as a potential defense, while also repeatedly acknowledging in subsequent filings that it had been “served” on the date of the original attempt. Grasshopper twice unsuccessfully moved to set aside the entry of default before moving for reconsideration and, at the superior court’s direction, recasting its argument under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) as a challenge to a void order. The superior court agreed that service had never been proper, held the entry of default void for lack of personal jurisdiction, and vacated it.
The court of appeals accepted special action jurisdiction and reversed, holding that Grasshopper waived its insufficient-service defense by failing to raise it in a motion to dismiss or its answer, by generally appearing and defending the action, and by repeatedly representing to the court that it had been served. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to decide whether Grasshopper waived its right to challenge the entry of default under these circumstances.
The Court held that McMahan’s process server did not properly serve Grasshopper, since delivering the complaint to an assistant who lacked actual or apparent authority to accept service on the company’s behalf did not satisfy Arizona’s service rules, even though the assistant forwarded the documents to Grasshopper. Because Grasshopper had not been properly served, had not consented to jurisdiction, and had not appeared in the action by the date the default became effective, the superior court lacked personal jurisdiction over Grasshopper at that moment, rendering the entry of default void from the outset rather than merely voidable.
The Court also addressed the variety of points on which the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that none of Grasshopper’s later conduct could cure that jurisdictional defect. Drawing on its decision in Lore v. Citizens Bank of Winslow, the Court explained that an appearance, whether general or special, submits a party to the court’s jurisdiction only from that point forward; it does not reach back to validate an order that was void when originally entered. Applying that principle, the Court rejected each of McMahan’s waiver theories in turn. Any forfeiture of the insufficient-service defense under Rule 12(h) for failing to timely raise it, any waiver arising from a later general appearance, and any effect from Grasshopper’s repeated acknowledgments that it had been served, could operate, at most, only from the date of that later conduct forward. None of it could retroactively supply the jurisdiction the superior court lacked six weeks earlier when the default became effective.
The Court also rejected the notion that Grasshopper’s later statements created apparent authority in its assistant to accept service, explaining that apparent authority is measured at the time of the alleged reliance—here, the date of the original service attempt—and that statements made months later could not have induced reliance on a day that had already passed.
Finally, the Court noted that although the superior court should have analyzed the motion under Rule 55(c)’s “good cause” standard rather than Rule 60(b)(4)’s void-judgment standard, since only an entry of default, not a default judgment, had been entered, that imprecision did not affect the outcome: a court confronted with an order entered without jurisdiction has no discretion to leave it standing under either standard.
Justin Ackerman represents clients in federal and state appellate matters in cases involving excessive force, wrongful death, personal injury, bad faith, and premises liability. After graduating as the valedictorian of his class from Phoenix School of Law, Justin worked as a law clerk for the Hon. Michael J. Brown in Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals. Following his clerkship, Justin has handled over 75 appeals, successfully arguing before the Arizona Court of Appeals, Arizona Supreme Court, and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Justin has spoken at many seminars on appellate preservation topics and is recognized as a Southwest Super Lawyers and Best Lawyers in the area of Appellate Practice.
jackerman@jshfirm.com | 602.263.4552 | jshfirm.com/jackerman