AZ Supreme Court Clarifies the Standard for Judicial Immunity and A.R.S. § 11-449

Arizona Supreme Court Clarifies the Standard For Judicial Immunity And A.R.S. § 11-449

 
Garibay v. Johnson
Arizona Supreme Court
March 13, 2025
JSH Attorney:  Ashley Caballero-Daltrey

The Arizona Supreme Court addressed the interplay between judicial immunity and the liability described in A.R.S. § 11-449 for “any misconduct in the service or execution” of a writ.  It held that the statute limits judicial immunity only where the officer willfully or intentionally fails to carry out a court directive, law, or rule, rather than negligence in the “manner of discharging such duties.”

The case arose from a Constable’s attempt to serve a writ of restitution on a tenant in an apartment complex in Tucson.  The tenant was being evicted for threatening a resident with a gun and disturbing the peace.  The Constable asked the apartment manager to accompany her while she served the writ.  Then they attempted to do so, the tenant fatally shot the Constable, the Manager, a visitor in the adjoining apartment, and then took his own life.

The Manager’s surviving spouse sued the Constable’s surviving spouse and a number of other defendants, alleging that the Constable was negligent and grossly negligent in how she served the writ.  He also alleged that the Constable had drugs and alcohol in her system while executing the writ.  The Constable’s spouse moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Constable was entitled to immunity.  After the superior court denied the motion, the Constable’s spouse filed a special action and the court of appeals held that the Constable was judicially immune.  The Manager’s spouse petitioned for review, which the Arizona Supreme Court granted.

The Arizona Supreme Court first concluded that common law judicial immunity applies to officers like constables and sheriffs when they are carrying out orders or serving an integral part of the judicial process, like the service of the writ in this case.  They lose the immunity if they act contrary to a court’s directive.

The Court then considered whether § 11-449 abrogates or limits that immunity.  It determined that the statute limits the immunity rather than abrogates it.  It limits immunity only where the officer is “guilty of any misconduct” in the service or execution of the writ.  The Court examined current and historical dictionaries as well as corpus linguistics to determine the meaning of misconduct, and it held that misconduct means “an intentional violation of an applicable rule, standard, or norm.”  The Court explained that this definition was consistent with prior caselaw.

Applying that definition, the Court concluded that the Manager’s spouse had failed to state a claim because he only alleged that the Constable was negligent or grossly negligent, which did not amount to “misconduct” under the statute.  Chief Justice Timmer specially concurred to argue that the Court should be cautious with its use of corpus linguistics as a statutory interpretation tool.