Court of Appeals Clarifies Standards for Special Action Jurisdiction and Withdrawing Admissions

Nunez v. Valente

Arizona Supreme Court

May 15, 2026

JSH Attorney:  Arcangelo Cella

Arizona Court of Appeals Clarifies Discretion to Exercise Special Action Jurisdiction and Standard for Allowing Withdrawal of Admissions

The Arizona Court of Appeals has discretion whether to exercise its jurisdiction over a special action. As a divided panel observed in Nunez v. Valente, whether to do so “can be an art, despite efforts to nudge it closer to science.” The majority reaffirmed that jurisdiction is appropriate in cases presenting purely legal issues, like the trial court’s interpretation of a Rule of Procedure or its application of an erroneous legal standard to undisputed facts. Accordingly, the majority accepted jurisdiction and granted relief because the trial court had misinterpreted Rule 36(b) and applied the wrong legal standard to the defendant’s motion to withdraw admissions.

Daniel Nunez sued Irene O’Connor Valente, his former fiancee, to partition a house that he alleged they owned jointly. Valente asserted various counterclaims, including breach of a promise to marry and unjust enrichment, as well as for declaratory relief and to quiet title. If proven, this alleged wrongdoing could bar Nunez from the equitable remedy of partition and establish Valente as the sole owner. Valente timely served requests for Nunez to admit facts dispositive of her counterclaims. Nunez failed to respond by the applicable deadline and thus admitted those facts according to Rule 36(a)(4).

Three days after the deadline, Valente moved to strike Nunez’s complaint. Ten days later, Nunez moved to withdraw the admissions, arguing that allowing him to do so would enable him to present his case on the merits and that Valente would not be prejudiced, as Rule 36(b) requires. Valente did not argue prejudice in her response. The trial court denied Valente’s motion to strike the complaint but denied Nunez’s motion to withdraw the admissions without addressing prejudice. Nunez moved for reconsideration on the same grounds, and Valente again did not address Rule 36(b) in her response. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration as well, also without mentioning prejudice.

Nunez filed a special action petition. The majority concluded that accepting jurisdiction was appropriate because interpreting and applying Rule 36(b) is a recurring legal issue of statewide concern. Responding to the dissent, the majority observed that, because the trial court denied Nunez’s motions for a lack of good cause rather than for a lack of prejudice, accepting jurisdiction was proper to correct a misinterpretation of the rule and avoid an erroneous judgment and later appeal.

The majority held that the trial court abused its discretion by applying a good-cause standard not mentioned in Rule 36(b) instead of assessing the two mandatory considerations stated in the text, promoting a decision on the merits and prejudice. The majority explained that, because the admissions went to the heart of the dispute and, if allowed to stand, would decide most or all of the case, permitting withdrawal would promote resolution on the merits. In addition, delay alone does not constitute prejudice, and Valente had not meaningfully argued that she had relied on the admissions.

The majority vacated the orders denying Nunez’s motion to withdraw the admissions and remanded the case so that the trial could apply Rule 36(b) correctly. It also observed that the trial court would have other tools for enforcing discovery deadlines and limitations, like fee-shifting orders, that are not case dispositive.